[Seminaire CREM] Présentation de Benoît Tarroux, GATE - Faculté Des Sciences Economiques

Abstract:
Mediation is one of the most widely used methods of conflict resolution, yet causal evidence on when and why it succeeds remains limited. This paper presents experimental evidence on the conditions under which a neutral third-party mediator who makes recommendations (\textit{evaluative mediation}) can enhance the efficiency and fairness of two-person bargaining outcomes. In a controlled laboratory setting, participants perform a real-effort task in which it is ambiguous whether performance differences reflect effort or luck, with relative performance determining their outside options. We compare a baseline bargaining treatment to three mediation interventions: bargaining with a mediator’s recommendation (T-REC), bargaining informed by the mediator’s perception of fairness (T-FAIR), and bargaining with an aggregate recommendation drawn from multiple mediators (T-NORM). Contrary to common wisdom, evaluative mediation does not systematically increase agreement rates, shorten negotiation time, or improve outcome fairness across treatments. On the other hand, our results also suggest that evaluative mediation is effective only when stakeholders trust the mediator.

Co-écrit avec Roberto Brunetti (U Paris et LEMMA) et João V. Ferreira (U Southampton)