Abstract:
This paper examines how principles of common-pool resource governance translate into concrete energy sharing rules in European energy communities. Treating energy communities as local energy commons, we conceptualise sharing rules as allocation rules for common-pool benefits. We address three questions: which types of rules are proposed in the scientific literature, which rules are implemented in Brussels energy communities, and how community characteristics relate to rule choice. We conduct a systematic literature review and compare it using original data on Brussels energy communities. We also document implemented rules and relate them to observable characteristics. The comparison reveals systematic divergences between rules favoured in modelling and those adopted in practice. We argue that sharing rules are core governance institutions rather than mere optimisation parameters, with implications for modelling choices and for the design of regulatory schemes.
co-écrit avec Marco Gazel et Isac Olave Cruz
Source : Open Agenda
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